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0. Introduction 
 
Recent international research has used the quantile regression technique to show that 
returns to education tend to be increasing when moving up along the wage distribution 
(Buchinsky, 1994, Machado and Mata, 2001, Pereira and Martins, 2002, 2004). This 
has been called ‘the inequality increasing effect of education’ (Machado and Mata, 
2005, p. 457): if we give more education to workers who have the same observable 
characteristics but are located at different quantiles of the wage distribution, then their 
wages will become more dispersed.  
 
This finding adds to the educational debate by warning policy makers that education 
may promote earnings differences. If conditional wage dispersion is higher among 
more educated individuals, then an educational expansion may raise overall wage 
inequality by raising the weight of the high-spread group. In this scenario, assessing 
the causes of the positive association between education and wage dispersion is of 
crucial importance, as countries where such causes are operating might wish to reverse 
the underlying causes.  
 
This paper asks to what extent the over-education phenomenon accounts for the 
inequality increasing effect of education1. It has been documented that over-educated 
workers earn i) less than workers who have the same education but hold jobs for which 
they are adequately educated, and ii) more than workers in the same jobs who have less 
                                                          
1 In an international review, Groot and Van den Brink (2000) find that about one fourth of the working 
population is over-educated. 
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education (Alba, 1993, Sloane et al., 1999, Dolton and Vignoles, 2000). Therefore, we 
expect that, relative to the adequately-educated, over-educated workers are located at 
lower quantiles of the earnings distribution and earn a lower return from their 
educational investment.  
 
Then the question in this paper is: can over-education account for the tendency of 
education to be less rewarded at lower deciles of the wage distribution? This hypothesis 
has not been empirically tested to date, even though many researchers have suggested 
it2. 
 
The next section describes the dataset and the definitions of over-education used in the 
paper. Section 2 calculates quantile returns to education and inspects whether over-
education accounts for the differences in the returns across quantiles. Section 3 presents 
concluding remarks. Appendix A contains the detailed estimation results.  
 
1. Data and definitions of over-education 
 
The data is taken from the most recent wave (2001) of the European Community 
Household Panel dataset (ECHP). This survey contains useful information on personal 
and labour market characteristics, including maximum level of education completed, 
hours worked and monthly wage, for a variety of European countries. I take Portugal as 
                                                          
2 For instance, Machin (1996), Green et al. (1999), Pereira and Martins (2002) and Fersterer and Winter-
Ebmer (2003). As Pereira and Martins (2002, p. 365) put it, “a situation where highly-schooled workers 
take jobs with a low skill requirement and consequent low pay would be consistent with this result”. 
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case study, for in this country the inequality increasing effect of education has been 
found to be particularly acute (Pereira and Martins, 2002, 2004). 
 
I restrict the sample to male wage earners aged between 18 and 60, who work normally 
between 15 and 80 hours a week, and are not employed in the agricultural sector. These 
restrictions leave us with a final sample of 2,042 individuals. 
 
There are several approaches to measure the extent of over-education3. Following most 
other authors, I use the worker’s self assessment regarding the match between the 
worker’s skills and the firm’s job requirements. In particular, I use two questions 
included in the ECHP, 
 
• Do you feel that you have skills or qualifications to do a more demanding job 
than the one you have now? 
• Have you had formal training or education that has given you skills needed for 
your present type of work? 
 
The previous questions provide us with different definitions of over-education (Alba 
and Blázquez, 2002). I define as 
 
1) ‘weakly over-educated’ those workers that answer ‘yes’ to both the above 
questions 
                                                          
3 These approaches are basically three: job analysis, realized matches, and the worker’s self-assessment. 
For further details, see Dolton and Vignoles (2000). 
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2) ‘incorrectly qualified’ those workers who answer ‘no’ to both the above questions4  
3) ‘strongly over-educated’ those workers that answer ‘yes’ to the first question and 
‘no’ to the second question, that is, those who are ‘weakly over-educated’ as well 
as ‘incorrectly qualified’.  
 
In the sample, the proportion of ‘weakly over-educated’, ‘incorrectly qualified’ and 
‘strongly over-educated’ workers is, respectively, 41.7, 67.4 and 25.1 per cent. 
 
2. Empirical models and results 
 
I proceed by comparing the quantile returns to education of two wage equations. The 
first one corresponds to a standard specification,  
 
where ln w is the logarithm of hourly wages and exp is experience, while uppersec and 
tertiary are dummies that are activated if the maximum education level attained by the 
individual i is, respectively, upper secondary or tertiary education. The excluded 
education category is ‘less than upper secondary education’5.  
 
                                                          
4 Even though this situation does not correspond to over-education strictly speaking, it reflects a 
qualification mismatch that is worth exploring. 
5 In the ECHP the education variable is coded in three levels. These were constructed following the 
ISCED-97 classification (OECD, 2003). 
)1(                                          etertiaryβuppersecβexpδexpδα wln θiiθ2iθ12iθ2iθ1θi +++++=
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The second specification extends the standard model to include over-education 
dummies, 
 
where overuppersec and overtertiary are, respectively, controls for over-education in 
the upper secondary and tertiary level6. I run this regression using the three alternative 
definitions of educational mismatch: weak over-education (Control 1), incorrect 
qualification (Control 2) and strong over-education (Control 3).  
 
Figures 1 and 2 present the quantile returns to education arising from the different 
specifications7. The corresponding estimates are reported in Appendix A. The main 
finding is that returns to education are increasing over the wage distribution, and over-
education can not account for this fact. In line with previous work, the coefficients of 
the standard model are increasing when moving from the lower to the upper quantiles. 
And, in the extended models, the quantile-return profile is as increasing over the wage 
distribution as in the standard model8.  
 
To provide a more detailed view, Tables 1 and 2 report return differentials between 
selected quantiles. Note how it is that differences across quantiles do not diminish after 
introducing controls for over-education. This result applies to both the secondary and 
                                                          
6 The use of over-education dummies in a wage regression is not new. See, for instance, Verdugo and 
Verdugo (1989), Dolton and Vignoles (2000) and Chevalier (2003). 
7 Note that these returns are measured in a comprehensive way, i.e., all indirect influences of education on 
wages – occupation, sector, etc. – are attributed to education itself.  
8 Though not reported, the over-education dummies are jointly significant in all regressions.  
(2)       uryovertertiaβceoveruppersβtertiaryβuppersecβexpδexpδα wln θiiθ4iθ3iθ2iθ12iθ2iθ1θi  +++++++=
 7
the tertiary level, to any definition of over-education, and to any region of the wage 
distribution considered.  
 
The last column of Tables 1 and 2 reports the F-test for the equality of coefficients at all 
quantiles. In the tertiary level, differences across quantiles remain statistically 
significant after controlling for over-education. In the secondary level, differences turn 
out to be non-significant in the standard model as well as in the extended models. 
 
Overall, the results show that the magnitude and significance of the differences in the 
returns across quantiles remain practically unaffected after controlling for over-
education. I argue, therefore, that the inequality increasing effect of education 
documented by previous works can not be attributed to the incidence of over-education. 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
Returns to education are typically increasing when moving up along the wage 
distribution. While researchers have focused on the inequality implications of this 
finding, little attention has been paid to the analysis of its causes.  
 
The results presented here warn policy makers that the positive association between 
education and within-groups earnings dispersion hinges on factors other than over-
education. To the extent that these other factors are mostly unknown, further research 
needs to be done. A candidate explanation is ability. If ability interacts positively with 
education, then returns to education must be higher among workers at high-pay jobs, 
 8
i.e., with more ability9. A second explanation has to do with qualifications, as 
differences in the returns within high-educated people may be due to differences in the 
type and quality of the qualifications provided by universities.  
 
In the future, the acquisition of new data containing detailed information on the 
individual’s educational qualifications and ability tests would enormously help in the 
task of understanding the sources of wage dispersion within education groups in 
Portugal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Arias et al. (2001) give partial support to this hypothesis. They find that once ability is controlled for, 
the tendency of education to be more rewarded at high-pay jobs, though still existent, becomes less acute.   
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Appendix A 
   
Table 1A. OLS and quantile returns to education – Standard model 
 
OLS θ =.10 θ =.20 θ =.30 θ =.40 θ =.50 θ =.60 θ =.70 θ =.80 θ =.90 
 TERTIARY .949
*** .776*** .848*** .878*** .963*** 1.003*** 1.038*** 1.070*** 1.079*** 1.100***
 (.047) (.122) (.067) (.053) (.049) (.058) (.043) (.043) (.045) (.064) 
UPPER SECONDARY .381*** .282*** .308*** .334*** .387*** .398*** .413*** .412*** .419*** .389*** 
 (.031) (.072) (.047) (.044) (.034) (.030) (.029) (.033) (.034) (.049) 
 
Note: i) *** signals significant at the 1% level; ii) OLS estimation is heteroskedastic-robust; iii) quantile 
standard errors are obtained using 500 replications.   
 
 
Table 2A. OLS and quantile returns to education – Model with Control 1 
 
OLS θ =.10 θ =.20 θ =.30 θ =.40 θ =.50 θ =.60 θ =.70 θ =.80 θ =.90 
 TERTIARY .965
*** .898*** .846*** .867*** 1.018*** 1.090*** 1.080*** 1.111*** 1.102*** 1.224***
 (.083) (.214) (.114) (.118) (.106) (.079) (.075) (.064) (.099) (.098) 
UPPER SECONDARY .302*** .221*** .251*** .240*** .262*** .320*** .316*** .320*** .337*** .324*** 
 (.043) (.100) (.046) (.050) (.053) (.045) (.047) (.041) (.062) (.089) 
 
Note: i) *** signals significant at the 1% level; ii) OLS estimation is heteroskedastic-robust; iii) quantile 
standard errors are obtained using 500 replications.   
 
 
Table 3A. OLS and quantile returns to education – Model with Control 2 
 
OLS θ =.10 θ =.20 θ =.30 θ =.40 θ =.50 θ =.60 θ =.70 θ =.80 θ =.90 
 TERTIARY .969
*** .845*** .847*** .913*** .986*** 1.036*** 1.070*** 1.080*** 1.102*** 1.120***
 (.051) (.113) (.067) (.059) (.048) (.059) (.047) (.043) (.049) (.069) 
UPPER SECONDARY .494*** .398*** .426*** .471*** .480*** .527*** .517*** .514*** .487*** .495*** 
 (.037) (.080) (.061) (.049) (.037) (.038) (.039) (.030) (.045) (.045) 
 
Note: i) *** signals significant at the 1% level; ii) OLS estimation is heteroskedastic-robust; iii) quantile 
standard errors are obtained using 500 replications.   
 
 
Table 4A. OLS and quantile returns to education – Model with Control 3 
 
OLS θ =.10 θ =.20 θ =.30 θ =.40 θ =.50 θ =.60 θ =.70 θ =.80 θ =.90 
 TERTIARY .963
*** .845*** .848*** .906*** .987*** 1.032*** 1.042*** 1.080*** 1.098*** 1.118*** 
 (.049) (.122) (.063) (.062) (.049) (.058) (.048) (.046) (.049) (.067) 
UPPER SECONDARY .408*** .325*** .324*** .355*** .405*** .411*** .437*** .447*** .449*** .454*** 
 (.034) (.075) (.051) (.050) (.038) (.034) (.035) (.038) (.039) (.050) 
 
Note: i) *** signals significant at the 1% level; ii) OLS estimation is heteroskedastic-robust; iii) quantile 
standard errors are obtained using 500 replications.   
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Tables 
 
         
 
Table 1. Dispersion across quantiles – Tertiary education 
 .90–.10 .90–.50 .50–.10 .70–.30 .70–.50 .50–.30 F-test(a) 
STANDARD  MODEL 0.324 0.097 0.227 0.192 0.067 0.125 F(4, 2060) = 3.30** 
MODEL WITH CONTROL 1 0.326 0.134 0.192 0.244 0.021 0.223 F(4, 2058) = 2.37** 
MODEL WITH CONTROL 2 0.275 0.084 0.191 0.167 0.044 0.123 F(4, 2058) = 2.89** 
MODEL WITH CONTROL 3 0.273 0.086 0.187 0.174 0.048 0.126 F(4, 2058) = 2.76** 
 
Note: (a) The F-test tests whether the coefficients at all quantiles (.10, .20,…, .90) are statistically different; 
** signals significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Dispersion across quantiles – Secondary education 
 .90–.10 .90–.50 .50–.10 .70–.30 .70–.50 .50–.30 F-test(a) 
STANDARD  MODEL 0.137 0.021 0.116 0.078 0.014 0.064 F(4, 2060) = 1.36 
MODEL WITH CONTROL 1 0.116 0.017 0.099 0.080 0.000 0.080 F(4, 2058) = 1.25 
MODEL WITH CONTROL 2 0.089 -0.040 0.129 0.043 -0.013 0.056 F(4, 2058) = 1.09 
MODEL WITH CONTROL 3 0.124 0.038 0.086 0.092 0.036 0.056 F(4, 2058) = 1.51 
 
Note: (a) The F-test tests whether the coefficients at all quantiles (.10, .20,…, .90) are statistically different. 
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Figure 1. OLS and quantile returns to tertiary education 
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Figure 2. OLS and quantile returns to secondary education 
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